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Can BLM Get to Net-Zero Emissions for Fossil Fuel
Development? A Proposed Road Map
Jamie Gibbs Pleune, John C. Ruple, and Nada Wolff Culver
“Let me be very clear today . . . The world does have a carbon budget. It’s
finite and it’s running out fast, and we need a rapid transition to net-zero.”1 The
chief executive officer of BP, Bernard Looney, might be an unexpected climate
spokesman, but his statement reflects scientific consensus. In 2019, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a special report
emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.2 Limiting global
warming requires adhering to a carbon budget that is being depleted as time passes.3
Jamie Gibbs Pleune is a Wallace Stegner Center Legal Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah. John C. Ruple is Professor of Law (research) and Wallace Stegner Center Legal
Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. Nada Wolff Culver is Vice President,
Public Lands and Senior Policy Counsel, at the National Audubon Society.
The authors would like to thank Jayni Foley Hein, Natural Resources Director, Institute for Policy
Integrity, New York University School of Law; and Justin Pidot, Professor of Law at the University
of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, for their thoughtful comments on early drafts of this
paper.
1

Robert Perkins, BP Sets Target for “Net Zero” Carbon Footprint by 2050, PLATTS OILGRAM
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2020.
2
Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE
IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL
RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO
ERADICATE POVERTY (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., IPCC 2018) [hereinafter IPCC
Summary for Policymakers].
3
Id. at 12, para. C.1.3.
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For this reason, the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report identified
“‘[f]ailure of climate change mitigation and adaptation’ [as] the number one risk by
impact and the number two by likelihood over the next ten years.”4
Regarding fossil fuel development on federal lands, the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) sits amidst a myriad of tensions that pull at the fabric of a
carbon budget.5 Almost one quarter of all U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
come from fossil fuels extracted from public lands.6 Although BLM has
acknowledged climate change risks in the past, under the Trump Administration,
the agency has rolled back methane reduction strategies,7 encouraged coal leasing,8
and expedited fossil fuel production on federal land.9 Even before these rollbacks

4

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2020, at 12, 34 (2020), available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf.
5
Recognizing that there are multiple types of greenhouse gases (GHGs) with differing properties,
this Article generally refers to GHG emissions as a whole, without distinguishing between the
different gases. However, where a specific statistic or reference identifies a particular gas or refers
to carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), the specificity is reflected in this Article. For more information
about the different properties of GHGs and for a definition of CO2e, see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview of Greenhouse Gases,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (last updated May 28, 2020).
6
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FEDERAL LANDS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SEQUESTRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES FOR 2005-14, at 1, 8 (2018), available at
https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2018/5131/sir20185131.pdf. This number includes upstream (extractionbased) and downstream (user-based) emissions.
7
See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or
Revision
of
Certain
Requirements,
43
C.F.R.
§pt.
3160
(2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-28/pdf/2018-20689.pdf (announcing rescission
of Obama-era rule that clarified BLM’s authority to set royalty rates at or above 12.5%).
8
Exec. Order No. 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg.
16093 (Mar. 31, 2017) [hereinafter E.O. 13783] (rescinding Executive Orders and Plans related to
responding to climate change and instructing all agencies to “suspend, revise, or rescind” agency
actions arising from instructions related to addressing climate change); Exec. Order No. 13868,
Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019);
Secretarial Order No. 3348, Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017).
9
See, e.g., E.O. 13783, supra note 8.
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were implemented, the United States was not on track to reach the carbon budget
targets that it had submitted to the United Nations.10
Regardless of the Trump Administration’s hostility to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change,11 BLM has a statutory duty set forth
in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) to coordinate
management of various resources “without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”12 Continuing to permit
fossil fuel development without adhering to a carbon budget violates this statutory
duty.
Until there is a federal carbon budget in place ensuring that increased
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from federal leases will not exacerbate climate
change, BLM should not authorize an increase in GHG emissions. Instead, BLM
should use its broad regulatory authority over federal mineral leases to impose a
net-zero obligation on all new development activity, including new wells on
existing leases. Requiring net-zero emissions from all new fossil fuel development
activity would be one way to create a predictable and transparent method of
balancing the interests of current lease holders with the necessity of adhering to a

10
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019, at 20 (2019),
available at
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y (noting that the U.S. target emission reductions were 26%-28% from 2005 levels by 2025
and expressing concern that the Trump Administration has reduced anticipated emission reductions
from power plants and frozen requirements for GHG reductions in vehicle emissions and fuel
economy standards, in addition to encouraging increased fossil fuel production on public land); see
id. at 26 (explaining that “continuation of current global policies would lead to a global mean
temperature rise of 3.5°C by 2100” with a range of 3.4°C to 3.9°C and a 66% probability).
11
Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2019.
12
42 U.S.C. §1702(c).
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science-based carbon budget. The existing legal framework provides a method of
implementing this budgetary restriction in a fair, transparent, justifiable, and
efficient manner. Using the permitting process to require mitigation of GHG
emissions would align with BLM’s statutory duties and strike a more appropriate
balance of resource uses to meet “the present and future needs of the American
people.”13
This Article is a summary of a longer, more detailed forthcoming
exploration of BLM’s statutory responsibility and authority to mitigate GHG
emissions from fossil fuel production, focusing on oil and gas leasing for context.
It argues that BLM must address climate change in its decisions. It also proposes a
legal strategy for BLM to require that all new oil and gas wells, including those on
existing leases, achieve net-zero GHG emissions (for upstream and downstream
emissions) as a condition of operational approval. While the following discussion
focuses on the oil and gas permitting process, the same principles could apply to
other permitting decisions.
I.

There Is Scientific Consensus About the Urgency of Reducing GHG
Emissions
Climate change is happening;14 it is worse than we expected;15 and it will

13

Id. (defining “multiple use” to include “management of the public lands and their various resource
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs
of the American people”).
14
1 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH
NATIONAL
CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT
36
(2017),
available
at
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf
(summarizing
“thousands of studies conducted by tens of thousands of scientists” to conclude that “evidence of a
changing climate abounds from the top of the atmosphere to the depths of the oceans”).
15
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 4, at 33 (reporting that climate change is “striking harder
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get even worse if we fail to act decisively.16 These facts prompted the IPCC to issue
a special report emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.17
Summarizing the best available science, the IPCC recognizes that human activities
have already caused 1°C of global warming, and will likely reach 1.5°C within the
next few decades.18 On the current global emissions trajectory, warming will reach
at least 3°C by the end of the century.19 Allowing global warming to exceed 1.5°C
will likely cause irreversible harm to planetary functions that support ecosystems,
biodiversity, and human civilizations.20
Increasing the atmospheric concentration of CO2 (and other heat-trapping
gases, like methane) caused this rise in temperature.21 Between 1958 and 2019, the
average annual CO2 concentration skyrocketed from 315 parts per million (ppm) to
more than 400 ppm.22 According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the
concentration of CO2 has increased 46% from pre-industrial levels, and the
concentration of methane has increased 165% during this time.23 Continuing to

and more rapidly than many expected”).
16
See generally IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 4, para. A.1.
19
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 27.
20
IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 5, para. A.3.1.
21
Executive Summary, in INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2018,
at ES-1, ES-2 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020) [hereinafter EPA Executive Summary],
available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory2020-chapter-executive-summary.pdf.
22
Global Carbon Dioxide Growth in 2018 Reached 4th Highest on Record, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Mar. 22, 2019, https://www.noaa.gov/news/global-carbon-dioxide-growthin-2018-reached-4th-highest-on-record; CO2 at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New
Milestone: Tops 400 ppm, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. GLOBAL MONITORING
DIVISION, May 10, 2013, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of
exceeding daily mean of 400 ppm).
23
EPA Executive Summary, supra note 22, at ES-2.
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increase GHG emissions will further degrade atmospheric composition and
exacerbate climate change. A global pathway, with no or limited overshoot of
1.5°C, would require a 45% decline in global anthropogenic GHG emissions by
2030, reaching net zero around 2050.24 “This equates to a remaining carbon budget
of less than 10 more years of emissions at their current level.”25
The observed and forecasted negative effects of climate change are
externalities that will amplify the longer they are ignored, which has implications
that BLM should consider during the fossil fuel permitting process.26 In other
words, there is no time to lose in moving toward net-zero emissions in order to
achieve a 1.5°C emissions pathway. Along that pathway, every source of GHG
emissions is significant.
II.

BLM Is Legally Obligated to Address Climate Change, Including in
Leasing and Permitting
FLPMA establishes a standard of care for BLM’s management of federal

land. BLM must make “judicious use” of federal lands without “permanent
impairment” to the productivity and quality of the environment.27 BLM “shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands.”28
24

IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 12, para. C.1.
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 4, at 35 (citing Robert McSweeney & Rosamund Pearce,
Analysis: Just Four Years Left of the 1.5°C Carbon Budget, CARBON BRIEF, Apr. 5, 2017,
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-four-years-left-one-point-five-carbon-budget).
26
See Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8-23 (2018) (describing externalities of fossil fuel
development that are unaccounted for in the current leasing structure).
27
43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (defining “multiple use”).
28
Id. §1732(b); see also Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on
25
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Congress requires BLM to manage for a multigenerational investment
horizon, employing a balance that “will best meet the present and future needs of
the American people.”29 Congress also identified discrete ecological values that
should not be permanently impaired. For example, FLPMA’s statement of purpose
instructs BLM to protect “the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.”30
Notably, the list of assets to be stewarded by BLM includes “atmospheric
values.” Congress understood at least some of the risks and challenges of
anthropogenic climate change when it used those words. Nine years before FLPMA
was passed, the Johnson Administration issued a White House report detailing the
risk of global warming caused by fossil fuel emissions and predicting now familiar
impacts: melting of the Antarctic ice cap, rising of sea level, and warming of sea
water.31 When Congress included “atmospheric values” in the list of resources that
BLM must protect, it had already received evidence that fossil fuel development
could threaten everything that depends on a safe and stable atmosphere.
More importantly, Congress understood that there would be multiple,
unforeseen challenges in striking the right balance of multiple uses. Congress
defined “multiple use” to include a “combination of balanced and diverse resources
that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations.”32 This broad

Federal Lands, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 316-26 (2017) (exploring BLM’s statutory duty under
FLPMA to mitigate climate change impacts).
29
43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (also requiring a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses “that
takes into account the long-term needs of future generations”).
30
Id. §1701(a)(8).
31
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL, PRESIDENT’S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE WHITE
HOUSE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT app. Y4, at 123-26 (1965).
32
43 U.S.C. §1702(c).
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language granted BLM regulatory flexibility to respond to new scientific evidence
and the changing societal needs. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when
interpreting the Clean Air Act, even if the Congress that drafted FLPMA “might
not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render [the Act] obsolete.”33
Broad language “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to
forestall such obsolescence.”34
Regardless of whether Congress explicitly understood that continued fossil
fuel development would permanently impair atmospheric values and harm future
generations, FLPMA’s broad language reflects an intentional effort to confer
flexibility necessary to respond to changing circumstances and scientific
developments. Scientific consensus regarding climate change indicates that
adhering to a 1.5°C carbon budget is necessary to avoid permanent impairment to
the atmospheric composition and to other natural systems that support civilization,
and to forestall widespread extinctions. Congress instructed BLM to respond to
changing circumstances by managing with a multigenerational horizon.35 The
sweepingly broad language used by Congress in FLPMA grants BLM the
regulatory flexibility to fulfill its statutory mandate by responding to the new
circumstances presented by climate change and to alter its oil and gas leasing
practices to utilize federal resources in a manner “that will best meet the present
33

Massachusetts v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
Id.
35
43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (defining “multiple use” to include “a combination that will best meet the
present and future needs of the American people” and a combination of uses that “takes into account
the long-term needs of future generations”).
34
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and future needs of the American people.”36
III.

Unbridled Fossil Fuel Development Violates FLPMA’s Standard of
Care
BLM has acknowledged that increasing GHG emissions may permanently

impair ecological systems, including the atmosphere.37 In January 2016, BLM
completed a scoping report on the federal coal leasing program.38 The scoping
report summarized the scientific consensus, including recent studies that “confirm
and further strengthen the conclusion that greenhouse gases endanger public
welfare, and emphasize the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”39 BLM
acknowledged that the atmospheric composition “may be approaching a critical
climate threshold beyond which rapid and potentially permanent—at least on a
human timescale—changes . . . may occur.”40 Abrupt and irreversible ecological
impacts, including species extinctions, “are expected to be exacerbated by climate
change.”41 Finally, BLM acknowledged that without mitigation, GHG
concentrations will climb to ever-increasing levels.42

36
37

Id.
BLM, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE

INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM: PROGRAMMATIC

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT—SCOPING REPORT 5-46 to 5-50 (2017) [hereinafter BLM,
FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT].
38

Id.
Id. at 5-50.
40
Id. (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING EARTH’S DEEP PAST: LESSONS
FOR
OUR
CLIMATE
FUTURE
2
(2011),
available
at
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13111/understanding-earth’s-deep-past-lessons-for-our-climatefuture).
41
BLM, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 38, at 5-51.
42
Id. at 5-50.
39

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668430

** Pre-Print **
50 Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis __ (Sept. 1, 2020).
These studies illustrate that exacerbating climate change will violate BLM’s
statutory duty to manage various resources “without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”43 “Crossing a critical
climate threshold” that compromises atmospheric stability will permanently impair
the atmospheric values upon which current and future generations depend.
Similarly, changes resulting in widespread extinction constitute permanent
impairment because extinction is irreversible. Additionally, widespread extinctions
damage the productivity of the land because the land cannot produce or rely upon
extinct species. Exacerbating the risk of these types of harms by allowing increased
fossil fuel development without mitigating GHG emissions does not meet BLM’s
statutory duty to establish “coordinated management of the various resources
without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and quality of the
environment.”44
Despite acknowledging the risks of unabated GHG emissions, BLM
continues to ignore the massive combined effect of its permitting decisions. BLM
administers oil and gas leases covering 25.5 million acres and these lands include
more than 96,000 producible oil and gas wells.45 In producing more than 274
million barrels of oil, 3.3 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 302 million tons of
coal each year,46 the combined effects of BLM’s management decisions
significantly affect U.S. and global emissions, a fact that BLM has avoided
43

42 U.S.C. §1702(c).
Id.
45
BLM,
U.S.
Department
of
the
Interior,
Oil
and
Gas
Statistics,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics (last visited
July, 23, 2020).
46
Office of Natural Resources Revenue, U.S. Department of the Interior, Production Data,
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/?tab=tab-production (last visited July 23, 2020).
44
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acknowledging formally.47
BLM’s current approach to oil and gas leasing, which often allows an
unmitigated increase in GHG emissions, is inconsistent with FLPMA’s mandate to
avoid permanently impairing ecological values, including the atmosphere. It also
violates BLM’s duty to manage resources with a multigenerational investment
horizon. Although agencies have broad discretion in how to respond to climate
change, that discretion does not extend to whether to address climate change. The
science of climate change is not a policy preference—it is part of a body of evidence
that arises in the context of every fossil fuel permitting decision.
A comprehensive and insightful review of climate-related cases between
2015 and 2020 published by the nonpartisan Environmental Law Institute reveals
that “vast judicial agreement exists on the causes, extent, urgency, and
consequences of climate change.”48 This observation “holds true across U.S.
federal and state courts, across different types of proceedings, and across
jurisdictions,” including international jurisdictions.49 The report takes care to point
out that even the parties, including government agencies like BLM, appeared to

47

See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity, Petition for a Moratorium on the Leasing of Federal
Public Land Fossil Fuels Under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 226, 241 Before the U.S.
Department
of
the
Interior
(July
12,
2016),
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/keep_it_in_the_ground/pdfs/Petition_for_a_Morat
orium_on_the_Leasing_of_Federal_Public_Land_Fossil_Fuels.pdf (submitted on July 12, 2016,
and still unaddressed or acknowledged); U.S. Climate Change Litigation, Petition for a Moratorium
on the Leasing of Federal Public Land Fossil Fuels, http://climatecasechart.com/case/petition-fora-moratorium-on-the-leasing-of-federal-public-land-fossil-fuels/ (last visited July 23, 2020)
(providing monthly updates on status of ongoing climate-related proceedings).
48
MARIA L. BANDA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CLIMATE SCIENCE IN THE COURTS: A
REVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS vi (2020).
49
Id.
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agree on basic climate science, even if they disagreed on the legal implications.50
Where agencies under the Trump Administration are reversing Obama-era policies
on climate change, courts have reminded the agencies that inconvenient facts
survive changes of administration. “An agency cannot simply disregard contrary or
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can
ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”51 Agency decisions that
“simply discarded prior factual findings related to climate change” have been found
arbitrary and capricious.52
It does not matter that BLM discussed the risks of “crossing a critical
climate threshold” in the context of coal mining, rather than oil and gas
development. The same facts apply to any fossil fuel. From tar sands to oil shale to
oil and gas development, the scientific studies referenced in BLM’s scoping report
were the preeminent studies reflecting the most current scientific understanding of
a global problem that is urgent and ubiquitous and caused by a class of fuel. In the
scoping report, BLM properly recognized that these studies forecast a risk of
permanent impairment caused by crossing a critical climate threshold. More recent
studies, like the IPCC special report emphasizing the importance of limiting global
warming to 1.5°C, further strengthen BLM’s recognition in the scoping report that

50

Id.
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 584 (D. Mont. 2018),
rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019).
52
Id. at 583 (holding that Trump Administration reversal of prior record of decision (ROD) denying
Keystone XL pipeline was arbitrary and capricious because the new ROD provided no justification
for the changed decision other than deleting the climate change-related content of the previous
ROD); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975, 999 (D. Mont. 2016) (finding
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service arbitrarily and capriciously ignored climate science in favor of
political pressures in its decision to reverse prior decision to list wolverine as endangered).
51
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exacerbating climate change may cause abrupt and irreversible changes, including
widespread extinctions.
A hallmark of administrative law is the requirement that agencies engage in
“reasoned decisionmaking.”53 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, “the
Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”54 One of those
square corners is the requirement to “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.”55 Whether GHG emissions come from coal
mining or oil and gas development, the relevant data indicate that continuing to
increase GHG emissions exacerbates the risk of crossing a critical climate threshold
and causing permanent impairment to the quality of the environment and the
productivity of the land. Ignoring this relevant data when making permitting
decisions is arbitrary and capricious.
IV.

Consistent With FLPMA’s Multiple Use Mandate, BLM Should
Require That All New Fossil Fuel Activity Achieve Net-Zero Emissions
BLM has broad authority under FLPMA, the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), and the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) to mitigate GHG
emissions. Until recently, both BLM and the U.S. Department of the Interior
embraced mitigation measures responding to climate change and landscape-scale

53

Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587, 2020 U.S. LEXIS
3254, at *20 (June 18, 2020) (noting that the procedural requirements of administrative law establish
the mechanism “by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to
review”).
54
Id. at *32.
55
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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management that included landscape-scale mitigation.56 BLM’s current policy
rejecting compensatory mitigation is inconsistent with precedent, contrary to
statutory authority, and lacks the force of law.57 Because Trump Administration
policies represent a policy choice, not a legal boundary of BLM’s authority, they
should not detract from an informed discussion of BLM’s legal authority to require
mitigation of GHG emissions.
Mitigation authority infuses BLM regulations. BLM has regulatory
authority to make decisions and set standards that avoid impairment of other
resources, consistent with its duties under FLPMA.58 For example, in combination
with FLPMA, NEPA requires BLM to consider and, in some cases, implement
alternatives that mitigate adverse impacts caused by a proposal. Department of the
Interior regulations implementing NEPA, which apply to BLM, require that every
proposed action include an analysis “of the effects of the proposed action or
alternative as well as analysis of the effects of any appropriate mitigation measures

56

See, e.g., Secretarial Order No. 3330, Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the
Department of the Interior (Oct. 31, 2013), revoked by Secretarial Order No. 3349 (Mar. 29, 2017);
BLM MANUAL MS 1794 MITIGATION (2016), and BLM MITIGATION HANDBOOK H-1794-1 (2016),
rescinded by Secretarial Order No. 3360 (Dec. 22, 2017); see also ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING THE MITIGATION
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR (2014); JESSICA HALOFSKY ET AL., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN UNITED STATES FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE SCIENCE AND
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: A SYNTHESIS (2015) (describing climate adaptation efforts by federal
agencies including BLM).
57
Justin R. Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1046, 1062 (2020);
Justin R. Pidot, The Bureau of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 30
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2019).
58
See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2003) (“FLPMA, by its plain
terms, vests the Secretary of the Interior with the authority—indeed the obligation—to disapprove
of an otherwise permissible mining operation because the operation, though necessary for mining,
would unduly harm or degrade the public land.”).
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or best management practices that are considered.”59 The MLA also grants BLM
broad authority to determine what lands to lease, and to manage leases in the public
interest.60 BLM mineral leasing regulations expressly reserve authority to impose
“reasonable measures as may be required . . . to minimize adverse impacts.”61
Specific to onshore oil and gas leases, BLM has regulatory authority “to
require that all operations be conducted in a manner which protects other natural
resources and the environmental quality.”62 Emphasizing this authority, oil and gas
leasing regulations also impose a duty on operators to comply with mitigationfocused restrictions. Operators must conduct “all operations in a manner . . . [that]
protects other natural resources and environmental quality; which protects life and
property.”63 Additionally, operators “shall conduct operations in a manner which
protects the mineral resources, other natural resources, and environmental
quality.”64
In other words, BLM has both options and the authority to act. Many
statutory and regulatory provisions grant BLM authority to regulate mineral leasing
operations in a manner that protects environmental quality. Undergirding those
59

43 C.F.R. §46.130(a) (2019).
See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §226(a) (the secretary “may” lease lands believed to have oil and gas
deposits); id. §226(b) (the secretary may by regulation establish a higher national minimum bid if
necessary); id. §226(m) (BLM may require lessees to operate under a reasonable cooperative or unit
plan; the secretary may prescribe a plan that may alter or modify the rate of prospecting and
development; the secretary may order communitization and apportionment of leases that cannot be
appropriately spaced; and the secretary may authorize subsurface storage of oil or gas to promote
conservation of natural resources); see also Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 109, 117-19 (2017).
61
43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019).
62
Id. §3161.2.
63
Id. §3162.1(a).
64
Id. §3162.5-1(a).
60
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regulations, FLPMA requires BLM to manage multiple uses (including mineral
development) without permanent impairment to the quality of the environment or
the productivity of the land.65
BLM has already used this authority to incorporate GHG mitigation
requirements into best management practices (BMPs) for oil and gas production.
For example, BLM recently published an environmental assessment related to the
sale of 283 parcels previously sold in a Wyoming oil and gas lease sale.66 In
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the federal court for the District of Columbia
concluded that BLM had sold the parcels without taking a “hard look” at the GHG
emissions that would result from the sale.67 In its post-remand environmental
assessment, BLM relied, in part, upon its mitigation authority at the development
stage to conclude that issuing the leases had no significant environmental impact.68
Specific to mitigation of impacts from GHG emissions, BLM identified
three sources of authority for mitigating GHG impacts before an oil and gas well
received a permit to drill. “Analysis and approval of future development of the lease
parcels may include application of BMPs within BLM’s authority, as Conditions

65

See supra Parts II and III.
BLM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
THE MAY 2015-AUGUST 2016 SOLD AND ISSUED LEASES DOI-BLM-WY-0000-2019-0007-EA 7
(2019)
[hereinafter
BLM,
EA
FOR
SOLD
WYOMING
LEASES],
https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/nepa/121368/170685/207328/20190412.WYSupplemen
talEA.WEGvZinke.Final.pdf.
67
368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 85 (D.D.C. 2019).
68
BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note 67, at 26 (explaining that the “sale of parcels
and issuance of oil and gas leases is an administrative action, without direct impacts to surface
resources” and subject to further environmental analysis that could avoid adverse impacts by
imposing mitigation requirements prior to any surface disturbance that would produce
environmental impacts, including emissions).
66
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of Approval (COAs) to reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.”69 BLM also clarified
that additional GHG mitigation measures could be incorporated as “applicantcommitted measures” or “added to necessary State of Wyoming air quality
permits.”70 These measures included requiring vapor recovery systems; conversion
to electric, solar, or mechanical pumps; and use of “green completions” that avoid
use of open pits and capture gas.71
Other BLM offices have also identified the possibility of imposing GHG
mitigation measures as BMPs or as COAs. For example, the Colorado BLM
published the Comprehensive Air Resource Protection Protocol identifying
emission mitigation strategies that include GHG emissions.72 These measures also
include minimizing or eliminating flaring of natural gas and using closed-loop
systems to capture gas, using electric or renewable energy to power compressors,
and capture and control of emissions from storage tanks and separation vessels.73
The protocol further explains that where identified mitigation measures cannot be
reasonably implemented, BLM may require emission offsets instead.74
BLM has relied on its authority under both the MLA and FLPMA to require
mitigation measures.75 In summary, BLM has already implemented procedures and
reasoning relying on its authority to incorporate GHG mitigation measures at the
69

Id. at 35.
Id.
71
Id. at 35-36.
72
COLORADO BLM, COMPREHENSIVE AIR RESOURCE PROTECTION PROTOCOL (CARPP) 15-20
(2015).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 11.
75
Id. at 4-5; BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note 67, at 9; see also Waste Prevention,
Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83008, 83019-20 (Nov.
18, 2016).
70
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application for permit to drill (APD) stage. Augmenting these measures to ensure
that they are evenhandedly enforced and consistent with a carbon budget is also
within BLM’s authority.
A.

BLM Has Statutory, Regulatory, and Contractual Authority to
Impose Mitigation Measures at Every Stage of the Process

Thousands of oil and gas leases, subject to hundreds of land use plans, are
already in effect at every stage of the development process. The following
discussion clarifies that BLM has authority to impose a net-zero requirement at
each of these stages. This clarification is important for assessing BLM’s authority
to quickly and evenhandedly implement a net-zero requirement on all new oil and
gas activity.
Oil and gas leasing decisions occur in three stages: (1) land use planning;
(2) leasing; and (3) APD approval. Each stage triggers NEPA, and BLM has
authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts at each stage.76
During stage one, BLM drafts resource management plans (RMPs)
encompassing vast landscapes.77 BLM must periodically update land use plans,78
and BLM’s regulations include a duty to revise land use plans based on “new data”
and “a change in circumstances.”79 The IPCC special report presents “new data”

76

See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 716 (10th Cir. 2009);
Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004); Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).
77
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
78
43 U.S.C. §1732(a); id. §1712(a) (BLM must “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate revise
land plans”); Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
2010).
79
43 C.F.R. §1610.4-9 (2019); id. §1610.5-6; id. §1610.5-5.
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indicating that climate change is already occurring, that the effects are more
dramatic than expected, and that this new, observation-based data caution against
exceeding 1.5°C in global warming. This information constitutes a change in
circumstances and warrants revising or amending land use plans that authorize
unmitigated fossil fuel development.
Using the land use planning process, BLM could adopt a universal
stipulation or programmatically amend existing land use plans to include a best
practice that is applicable to all new leases. The lessee’s GHG mitigation strategy
could be submitted as part of the drilling plan and incorporated as a COA. As BLM
recognized in its coal program scoping report, a net-zero requirement could be
achieved by requiring the lessee to carry out (or fund) activities that proportionally
offset emissions.80 “This approach has been used under the Endangered Species Act
and Clean Water Act as an efficient way to provide appropriate and measurable
benefits to a resource that has been negatively affected through a proposed
action.”81
For example, lessees could implement methane reduction strategies such as
plugging abandoned wells sufficient to offset the anticipated CO2 equivalent
emissions.82 So long as the emission reduction activities are not otherwise required
by law, a company’s GHG reductions could partially or fully offset the emissions
from new wells. Alternatively, a lessee could offset emissions through investment
80

BLM, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 38, at 6-17 (“Alternatively,
under this option, the BLM could approve transactions proposed by lessees that would achieve the
desired outcome of compensatory mitigation, but for which projects were carried out by private
businesses, non-profits, or state or local agencies.”).
81
Id.
82
EPA Executive Summary, supra note 22, at ES-8 (abandoned oil and gas wells have steadily
produced between six and seven million metric tons of CO2e between 1990 and the present).
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in carbon sink strategies verified by a third party. Although there are still challenges
to be worked out, a market already exists to utilize third-party providers who verify
and manage net-zero commitments.83
The land use planning process has been used in the past to respond to new
data and changing circumstances. For example, to adopt sage-grouse protections
across the bird’s range in 10 western states, BLM revised or amended 98 RMPs to
incorporate mitigation strategies designed to protect habitat.84 To ensure that the
mitigation measures were implemented consistently, BLM issued an instructional
memorandum detailing implementation of the procedures designed to incorporate
mitigation into the leasing and APD processes.85 Using a similar approach would
require a thorough NEPA assessment that should be accomplished through a
programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS). The PEIS should also
address the other two stages of the leasing process.
The second stage of the leasing process occurs when BLM offers specific
parcels of land for sale.86 Leasing decisions usually tier to the RMP while affording
an opportunity to take a closer look at information not considered at the much
broader land planning level. At the leasing stage, BLM should conduct a more
focused NEPA analysis to identify whether site-specific limitations or monitoring

83

See generally Michael A Mehling, Governing Cooperative Approaches Under the Paris
Agreement, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 765 (2019).
84
See Montana Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90571, at *6-8 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020) (discussing Instruction Memorandum No. 2016-143 (Sept.
1, 2016), which was replaced by later guidance that was invalidated in this decision for not
accurately reflecting the requirements of the overarching land use plans).
85
Id.
86
See Bruce Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills
Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. 599, 608-09 (2010).
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and evaluation results require additional mitigation measures as part of an adaptive
management strategy.87 Even if an RMP allows a particular land use, the sitespecific analysis provides an opportunity to assess whether the assumptions
supporting the RMP decision remain valid, and whether there are additional or new
site-specific considerations that may have a significant effect on the environment.
BLM has authority to impose stipulations at the prepurchase leasing stage,
including mitigation measures identified during the NEPA process.88 Because the
lease is a contract, BLM has broad authority to define the terms of the contract prior
to sale.89
At the third stage, the lessee submits a site-specific drilling and reclamation
plan as an APD that BLM must approve. BLM has authority to require mitigation
at this stage, and it has already acknowledged that this authority includes imposing
GHG mitigation requirements.90 Consistent with the plain language of the standard
lease form, the “[l]essee must conduct operations in a manner that minimizes
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other
resources, and to other land uses or users.”91 BLM retains extensive authority to
87

43 C.F.R. §46.145 (2019) (directing interior bureaus to use “adaptive management” as part of the
NEPA process, especially “in circumstances where long-term impacts may be uncertain and future
monitoring will be needed to make adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions”).
88
Id. §3101.1-3 (“Any party submitting a bid . . . shall be deemed to have agreed to stipulations
applicable to the specific parcel.”); BLM & U.S. FOREST SERVICE, SURFACE OPERATING
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE GOLD
BOOK §2.3 (4th ed. 2007) (“Constraints may result from lease stipulations, the surface management
agency’s review and environmental analysis of the proposed operations, Notices to Lessees,
Onshore Orders, or regulations.”).
89
Pendery, supra note 87, at 642; Burger, supra note 29, at 319-21.
90
See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
91
BLM, U.S. Department of the Interior, Form 3100-11, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas
§6 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Standard Lease Form 3100-11]; see also 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019)
(clarifying that a lessee’s surface rights are subject to stipulations and “such reasonable measures as
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require that mitigation measures, best practices, and other “reasonable measures
deemed necessary” be incorporated into the drilling plan as a condition of APD
approval.92 Best practices and mitigation measures may be incorporated as part of
the drilling plan, even if they were not anticipated at the time of the lease sale.93 A
lessee challenging a requirement included as a COA at the APD stage must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigation measure was erroneous.94
Where mitigation measures are based on scientific evidence and environmental
analysis, BLM’s reasoned opinion is entitled to “considerable deference.”95 Thus,
BLM has regulatory and contractual authority to impose a net-zero mitigation
requirement on permits for leases that have already been sold.
BLM cannot claim that it is “too late” to impose a stringent mitigation
requirement at the APD stage, because it frequently lauds its extensive authority to
mitigate environmental impacts at the APD stage.96 BLM and industry have long
used BLM’s regulatory authority at the APD stage to justify a truncated NEPA
analysis at the leasing stage, while promising a more detailed analysis of mitigation

may be required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values,
land uses or users not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed”).
92
Standard Lease Form 3100-11, supra note 92, §6.
93
Yates Petroleum Inc., 176 I.B.L.A. 144, 154 (2008) (upholding mitigation measures imposed as
COAs that were more stringent than standards in the RMP).
94
Id.; see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 I.B.L.A. 300, 307 (2000) (holding that a lessee challenging
a remedial requirement imposed as a COA at the plugging and abandonment stage “must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that such a requirement is excessive”).
95
Yates Petroleum Inc., 176 I.B.L.A. at 157 (citing authorities).
96
See, e.g., Duna Vista Resorts, 187 I.B.L.A. 43 (2016) (arguing that it was appropriate to issue a
finding of no significant impact (FONSI) at the leasing stage because BLM had authority to mitigate
all potential environmental effects by imposing COAs at the APD stage, including dictating which
formation the lessee could drill into); see also BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note
67, at 26, 35.
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measures at the APD phase.97 Especially where analysis has been deferred, it is
appropriate to use the NEPA process at the APD stage to explore and require
mitigation opportunities. In a similar context, a federal court in Colorado rejected
BLM’s claim that it is “too late” to analyze and mitigate GHG emissions after
having delayed a thorough NEPA analysis at an earlier stage of the leasing process.
“Under this reasoning, it could theoretically reward agencies for skirting NEPA
requirements in prior stages of oil and gas development, which does not align with
the informed decision-making goals of NEPA.”98
In summary, if BLM and industry justify postponing the NEPA analysis at
the leasing stage by promising to evaluate mitigation measures at the APD stage,
then BLM cannot justify foregoing consideration of mitigation measures at the
APD stage by claiming that it is now too late for that analysis. Thus, for many
existing leases, BLM could reasonably require lessees to include GHG mitigation
measures in the drilling plan and require net-zero emissions as a COA at the APD
stage.

97

See, e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M.
2018); see also Park County Res. Council Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621-22 (10th
Cir. 1987) (holding that BLM was not required to address potential mitigation measures of lease
stipulations at the leasing stage because “[i]n order to work the lease, the lessee must submit sitespecific proposals to the Forest Service and BLM who can then modify those plans to address any
number of environmental considerations” and “each action is subject to continuing review”),
overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970,
972 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
98
Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo.
2019) (holding that because downstream emissions were not considered at the leasing stage, the
“earliest possible time” mandated by NEPA required that they be considered at the master
development plan stage: “[s]ince it did not happen before, this stage of the development process
would be the earliest possible time”).

23

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668430

** Pre-Print **
50 Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis __ (Sept. 1, 2020).
B.

BLM Can and Should Consistently Impose GHG Mitigation
Measures Sufficient to Adhere to a Science-Based Carbon
Budget

GHG mitigation requirements should be universally and fairly
implemented. Developing a complete and equitable implementation strategy will
take time. BLM has authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas leasing while
it develops a comprehensive GHG mitigation policy, so that unmitigated GHG
emissions do not continue until the new policy and requirements are in place.99 The
authority to pause onshore oil and gas leasing was discussed in detail in a 2019
article published by Professor (and former Interior Solicitor) John Leshy, Interior’s
Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, and this Article builds on the welldeveloped reasoning set out in that article. The MLA requires that public lands
“may” be leased.100 While the MLA, as amended by the Federal Onshore Oil and
Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987,101 requires that lease sales be held quarterly, this
requirement applies “where eligible lands are available” for leasing.102
Accordingly, where the secretary determines that no eligible lands are available for
sale, he or she is not obligated to hold lease sales.
As discussed by Professor Leshy, the secretary has historically relied on
executive authority, withdrawal authority under FLPMA, and land use planning

99

United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding moratorium on
oil and gas leasing); John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELR
10631, 10631-32 (July 2019); Burger & Wentz, supra note 61, at 118-19 (discussing statutory and
precedential authority to impose moratoriums on coal and oil and gas leases).
100
30 U.S.C. §226(b)(1).
101
Id. §181 et seq.
102
Id. §226(b)(1)(A).
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authority under FLPMA.103 BLM’s authority to impose a moratorium on oil and
gas leasing ultimately arises from the agency’s overarching duty articulated in
FLPMA to manage multiple uses without permanent resource impairment.104
Moreover, the MLA vests BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure
of mineral leasing, including suspension of operations in the interest of
conservation.105 Federal courts have recognized that the phrase “in the interest of
conservation” used in the MLA includes the prevention of environmental harm.106
BLM has relied upon these sources of authority to adjust the pace of oil and gas
leasing in the past.107

103

Leshy, supra note 100, at 2-3.
Other provisions further emphasize this duty. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §1732(b) (“In managing the
public lands, the BLM shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”). Courts have recognized that BLM has authority
to incorporate mitigation measures into project authorizations to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76, 78
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing with approval Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, 174 I.B.L.A. 1, 5-6
(2008), which held that an environmental impact may rise to the level of unnecessary or undue
degradation if it results in “something more than the usual effects anticipated from . . . development,
subject to appropriate mitigation” (emphasis added)). Since climate change will harm all of the
resources that BLM manages, incorporating mitigation measures to avoid this degradation is
required by this affirmative obligation.
105
See 30 U.S.C. §209 (“In the event the Secretary of the Interior, in the interest of conservation,
shall direct or shall assent to the suspension of operations and production under any lease granted
under the terms of this Act . . . .”); 43 C.F.R. §3103.4-4(a) (2019) (“A suspension of all operations
and production may be directed or consented to by the Authorized Officer only in the interest of
conservation of natural resources.”); see also Burger & Wentz, supra note 61, nn. 26-27 (listing
provisions in the MLA that vest BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure of oil and
gas leasing); see also Leshy, supra note 100, at 10631-32 (challenging Secretary Bernhardt’s
suggestion that BLM lacks authority to impose a moratorium by reviewing the discretionary
language in 30 U.S.C. §226(a) combined with precedent upholding a moratorium and subsequent
legislative history of the MLA).
106
Copper Valley Mach. Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v. Babbitt,
129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997).
107
See Instruction Memorandum No. 2016-143, Implementation of Greater Sage-Grouse Resource
Management Plan Revisions or Amendments—Oil & Gas Leasing and Development Sequential
104
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Imposing a moratorium on new leasing will provide an opportunity for
BLM to assess the existing inventory of leased lands and determine how to address
future development, including GHG mitigation.108 It will also provide BLM an
opportunity to reconsider how to allow development of oil and gas leases “without
permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the
environment” consistent with BLM’s statutory mandate.109
Regarding leases that have already been sold but not yet put into production,
BLM should conduct a thorough environmental assessment to determine whether
the cumulative effect of issuing drilling permits for the existing inventory of
nonproducing leases (14,119 leases representing 12,757,922 acres)110 will have a
significant impact on the environment.111, 112 The analysis could be included in the
Prioritization 7 n.10 (Sept. 1, 2016).
108
See Secretarial Order No. 3338, Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
to Modernize the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016) (justifying a pause on the issuance of new
federal coal leases to avoid “locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of
coal under current rates and terms that the PEIS may ultimately determine to be less than optimal”).
109
43 U.S.C. §1702(c).
110
BLM, supra note 46. Comparing information from Tables 1, 2, 5, and 6 reveals that in 2018,
there were 38,147 leased parcels (representing 25,552,475 acres) but only 24,028 producing leases
(representing 12,794,553 acres). The difference is 14,119 leases (representing 12,757,922 acres)
that have not been put into production.
111
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2020) (“ 40 C.F.R. §1501.5(a) (2020) (“An agency shall prepare an
environmental assessment . . . when the significance of the effects is unknown unless the agency
finds that a categorical exclusion (§ 1501.4) is applicable or has decided to prepare an environmental
impact statement.”)..”).
112
Recent amendments to NEPA’s implementing regulations eliminate the term “cumulative
effect.” We strongly caution against reading the new regulations as eliminating the need for a
cumulative effects analysis because federal courts consistently hold that the Act requires an
assessment of cumulative effects, and these cases predate regulations codifying and then defining
away cumulative effects. See generally, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.,
1975) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis for dredging the Thames River), see also Jones v.
Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis), and Swain v.
Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 1975) (same). The CEQ’s new regulations can refine
regulations but they cannot eliminate a requirement that emanates from the Act itself, which courts
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PEIS or conducted independently. BLM could also use the NEPA process to
evaluate whether mitigating GHG emissions through offsets would be a
“reasonable measure” necessary to “minimize adverse impacts to land, air, and
water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or
users.”113
If the NEPA process determines that it is a “reasonable measure” in light of
the risks of exacerbating climate change, then BLM could require a net-zero plan
from all lessees at the APD stage. Lessees who desired to proceed before BLM can
complete a cumulative effects analysis for all sold but not yet producing leases and
could agree to voluntarily mitigate GHG emissions.114 Assuming that there are no
other significant environmental impacts, committing to achieve net-zero emissions
could justify a mitigated finding of no significant impact (FONSI), with respect to
GHG emissions, and the approval of the pending APD prior to the completion of a
cumulative effects analysis for similarly situated leases or prior to the completion
of the PEIS.
Thus, the existing regulatory structure, combined with the reasoned

from multiple circuits were interpreting in the aforementioned cases. The new regulations also do
not prevent consideration of cumulative effects, and any NEPA process that ignores cumulative
effects will likely face swift legal challenge.
113
Standard Lease Form 3100-11, supra note 92, §6; see also 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019) (clarifying
that a lessee’s surface rights are subject to stipulations and “such reasonable measures as may be
required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values, land uses
or users not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed”).
114
See Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing circuits that endorse the practice
of mitigated FONSIs and explaining: “This situation occurs when an agency or involved third party
agrees to employ certain mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise significant impacts of an
activity on the environment to a level of insignificance. In this way, a FONSI could be issued for an
activity that otherwise would require the preparation of a full-blown EIS.”). Notably, the CEQ’s
2020 NEPA regulations continue to recognize mitigated FONSIs. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c).
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decisionmaking process imposed by NEPA, provides BLM with authority and
opportunity to require mitigation of adverse environmental effects caused by oil
and gas operations. Because exacerbating climate change is an adverse effect
caused by the combined effect of oil and gas operations that increase national GHG
emissions, BLM should use its existing authority to require that all new oil and gas
activity incorporate GHG mitigation strategies in drilling plans. BLM could
reasonably include a net-zero emission strategy as a COA for all new oil and gas
wells.
V.

Conclusion
The world has a finite carbon budget that is being depleted while the United

States fails to act forcefully. Failure to stay within the carbon budget will exacerbate
climate change and result in “permanent impairment of the productivity of the land
and quality of the environment.” Entrusted with managing the nation’s mineral
estate, BLM sits at the crossroads of this transition. Continuing to authorize fossil
fuel development without requiring GHG mitigation will exacerbate climate
change and violate BLM’s statutory mandate.
BLM has regulatory authority over the oil and gas leasing and development
process. Oil and gas regulations reflect BLM’s statutory duty to mitigate adverse
effects on other resources and other land users. In light of the risks posed by
exacerbating climate change, mitigating the increase in GHG emissions associated
with expanded oil and gas development is reasonable and justified. Within the
existing legal framework, BLM has authority to impose mitigation measures at
every stage of the oil and gas leasing process. Thus, BLM could incorporate a netzero requirement on all new leases, as well as leases that have been sold, but have
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not yet applied for an APD.
To fulfill its multiple use mandate, BLM should use this authority,
combined with the NEPA process, to incorporate GHG mitigation measures as part
of the oil and gas leasing and development process. BLM should require that all
new oil and gas development activity incorporates GHG mitigation strategies
sufficient to achieve net-zero emissions.
To ensure consistent implementation, and to comply with NEPA, BLM
could impose a moratorium on oil and gas leasing until the completion of a PEIS.
To determine whether leases that have been sold but have not obtained an APD
should be included in the PEIS, BLM could conduct an environmental assessment
to determine whether the effect of issuing APDs to all similarly situated,
nonproducing leases would have a significant environmental effect. Lessees could
avoid waiting for the results of the environmental assessment and potential EIS by
voluntarily agreeing to mitigate GHG emissions in order to obtain a mitigated
FONSI (assuming that there were no other significant impacts). This approach
would be consistent with BLM’s statutory duty to manage federal lands according
to a standard of care, with a multigeneration time horizon, and without permanent
impairment of the nation’s ecological resources, including the atmosphere.
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